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INTRODUCTION* 
PURPOSE AND STUDY APPROACH 
This report, in two parts, presents a program development plan for attempting 
a first manned lunar landing in 1967. The two ·parts··consist of a Summary Report and 
a Detailed Report representing the coordinated output of the ad hoc task group as-
signed to the study. The study was started in response to the request for such ,a 
study by the Associate.Administrator in his memorandum of· May 2, 1961 establishing the 
Ad Hoc Task Group. · 
The purpose of the study was to talce a fi:rst·cut at the tasks associated.with 
the design, development and construction of the equipment and facilities·as· well as 
the development of the crews, and to show the· time ·phaslilg .. of··these tasks:; Included 
are the space science, life science and advanced technolc:>gy tasks whose data and re-
sults are needed for q.esigning and developing the.systems required in carryirig·out 
the mission. ' '· ' a. ' 
The plan presented in the two reports does -not·· presume·· to·· be a firm plan. Its 
basic. purpose is, by choosing one feasible method~· to· size .. up the· scope, schedi,1le ·a.pd .. 
cost of the Job, discover the main problems, pacing.items and.major decisions and 
provide a threshold from which a firm and·detailed·project development plan can be jointly formulated by the various elements of NASA.· 
Parallel to this study a second NASA"studynas·beeii carried out to·examihe 
other ways of accomplishing the manned_:J.1,_ina.rmissioh·tha.n the direct ascent method 
with chemical boosters. (A Survey of Various Vehicle Systems·for the Manned Lunar 
Landing Mission, NASA, Lun~il). Committe~ Report, June 10, 1961.) _ 
*This introduction is included in·both the Sununary Report and the Detailed Report. 
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The ultimate method chosen for the mission must still be decided and a firm plan 
defined.· The 1967 target date for the first manned flight to the moon ·is a radical 
departure from the NASA Long Range Plan of January 1961. Th:e latter was paced in 
accordance with a budget growth in space .exp;J...oratioµ aimed. at performing the first 
flight in the post-1970 period whereas this ~~report. indicates how an early mission can 
be accomplished, and how much it will cost. 
The study does not consider the nature of ·the activities on the lunar surface,:: 
once the crew land~, nor how long they will.stay ·there before return:1,ng t9 earth. It 
was believed· tli~t'. this -was 'nc,t . of _vitai concern at this preJ:im4,la:cy stage· of the . _ 
plann1ng/ ·However,-· it .must cer~ainly be giv~n serious consideratio~ in any further 
planning. ' . · · -. ·:· · '·: . -' · ·· · · · · · · · 
The study was directed· by '.the···headqti.arters; staff .:-but ·a ri"wnber of fi~ld center . 
personnel were brought in to participate as members of the task group. ·Tlie many tasks·· 
involved in each phase of the program were defined and _irlter:related in time and .. se-
quence 'ne_tworks ... These :p.etworks_·_ were machirie pr~c~sse.d· by ·the Seqµe~ced Milestone . 
System, a·variation of PERT, to discover slaqks and·overruns in p!'ogram time. After 
severa1·trials, compatible.networks were derived which fitt~d.the chosen starting 
date· of July 1, 1961 :~d the missi,on target d,ate or· August 1967. A ·total .9f about· . 
1800 discreet tasks were included in the ultirria.te composite networks'of the complete_.:. 
program. 
GROUND'RULF.S 'AND.GUIDELINES 
Thefoll'owing ground rules and guideliiies-have governed-the flexibility of the· 
program development plan. Some were established· by· the Associate Admiifistra.tor · in _ 
his directive of~ 2, 1961 initiating the study, other~· evolved j.rt the.early part· 
of the study • 
1~ Manned·. lunar landir:ig target · date· i_Il · 1967. 
2. 
. ' 
Direct ascen. t.w. ithout rendezvous ·w_ a.s the ·_ap:pro.ach··selecte_·_a_ ear1Y __ jJ'l- ·the 1·-_ 
study. However, rendezvous was· c9nsidered to be .. an essentiar ~rogranCin · 
its _ own right., It was not included. 1ri ·the· funding~ for the manned --lunar· ·:· 
landing program even though it ·may. _;?~rve as· ~- ·backup method for accompl'ish-\ 
ing the miss ion. · ·· ··, 
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4. 
5. 
6. 
8. 
9. 
Intermediate major space missions ·such as.manned circumiunar flight, un-
manned soft lunar landing, etc., are desirable-at the earliest possible 
date to aid in the development·of the manned lunar -landing system and to 
- produce a series of accomplishments . between now ~d 1967. - · · · . 
The use of Saturn C-2 for intermediate missions may be evaluated relative·: 
to an alternate la'IJ,Ilch vehicle having a higher thrust first ·stage .and c.:.2 
upper stage components. -
· Parallel development of' liquid and solid propu1~-ion leading to a 'Nova 
vehicle is to be assumed. · · · · 
Nuclear powered launch vehicles--shill ·n:ot·be· considered in the.first manned 
lunar landing mission. However, nuclear··power··generation squrce· ·~y ,be.· .. _ 
considered for the spacecraft if it appears feasible within the time limita-
tions of the program schedule. ·· · 
The flight test program ·is to be ·1aid-out·w1tn adequate launching to meet 
the needs of_the program consider~ the re~~~~i~~t;~s involved. 
Alternate approaches should be provi<iE:~.- ~- C?~~t:1:cal_ ~reas.·_ 
Booster recovery will be-considered only secondarily,-i.e., if it doesn't 
slow up the development program. · -
10. DOD help or facilities should be C?~~~d~:r:'~<i._~ . 
11. High reliability escape and abort capabilities will be stressed. 
PROGRAM .. ELEMENTS . 
The tasks which comprise the total ·program a.re--groilped into--the folloWing six 
major.categories, each of which is prograriuned,separately and treated separately in 
the detailed report. · ' 
1. 
2. 
The manned spacecraft, including.its instrumentation~ life support equip-
ment, etc. 
. - . 
The launch vehicles (including alternative ·and/or backup approaches) and 
the spacecraft propulsion system for moon landing and take-off. 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Ground support facilities, including those for hardware development, launch, 
tracking arid data acquisition and advanced research.. · 
Life sciences, including investigation of the effects of the space and 
lunar environment on man and his tolerance levels and the requirements 
for his protection and functioning. 
Space science prerequisites, including ·probes and space vehicles for in-
vestigating the cislunar and moon surface environment. 
Advanced technology programs to obtain knowledge needed ·in the design, de-
velopment of vehicle systems and in the protection of man against reentry 
heating and radiation. 
USE OF THE.SEQUENCED MILESTONE SYSTEM 
The.NASA Sequenced Milestone.System·(sMS) was·usea·as aplahning· a.id,to .. iriter-
relate the program elements and to develop t;he master·fli.glit plan. The SMS is ·an 
adaptation of the-well established-Navy PERT system which has the following. features: 
a. 
b. 
- -·. -· . -- . 
A netwo~k of activities· (tasks) and milestones placed in·· a :dependent 
sequence. 
The use.of da.ta .. processiilg equipment to ·determine critical paths 
(pacing items) and slack. · 
- - - ... 
- -In the development of the master flight plan, the SMS.was used to: 
a. Assess relative merits of alternate approaches. 
b. Identify key decision mdlestones and establish the latest allowable 
dates by when such decisions must be made. 
c. Identify pacing items and test the effects ·or adding resources. or:· 
considering parallel efforts. 
d.··. Identify those tasks which must be started·.1mmediately ...... .. 
e. Assist in determination of 'funding requirements and rate of funding 
,l;>u::tld-up. 
. ~.· . 
·4 . 
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PROGRAM FUNDING 
Generally, the cost associated with a program is considered after the planning of the 
technical program and the time phasing have been completed. In this study, a different 
approach was used in that a range of budget figures was derived early in the effort and 
revised as the technical program and its schedule were refined. The entire budget is keyed 
to the Sequenced Milestone System (SMS), adjustments being made as the program schedule was 
changed for various elements in the SMS network. There have been three major reviews, eac~ 
narrowing down the range of budget figures. The final "hard munbers" are presented in the 
summary report and elaborated on in the detailed report. 
The budget presented is a "requirements budget" in that it is built from the bottom 
up. An arbitrary ceiling was not imposed on any of the groups working on the program. 
The budget has been composed from the bits and pieces comprising the time-phased technical 
tasks and constrained by the assumed rates with which NASA and industry can be geared up 
to do the job in the early part of the program. Hundr.eds of man-hours have been spent 
at NASA Headquarters and the fJeld centers and data in great detail has been developed, 
reviewed and coordinated. As a result, a high degree of confidence can be placed in the 
FY 1962 and 1963 figures. The projected costs for FY 1964 and beyond are considered an 
order of magnitude better than those ordinarily developed for a comparable span of 
budgetary increments. 
\ 
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PROGRAM PLAN 
OBJECTIVES 
The basic objectives of the manned lunar landing study are shown in figure 1. These 
objectives are to show the feasibility of the mission, the magnitude and scope of the effort, 
the various programs and development necessary to accomplish the mission, the time phasing and 
inter-relationships of the various elements of the program and supporting activities, the areas 
where effort must be_ initiated or accelerated to generate the required technological data and, 
finally, the major management· decisions and :actioµs ··nece~sary to implement the program. In · 
addition to these objectives, the total program cost will be indicated with particular emphasis 
on FY 1962 and 1963 budget requirements. · 
The study has in it a degree of conservatism with regard to the feasibility of accomplish-
ing the mission and the size of the program required. At the same time, however, the program 
has a degree of optimism in it with regard to the time required to complete the mission, since 
time for contingencies for unknown major technical difficulties has not been included. Thus 
should any major technical problems or set-backs occur during the course of the program, some.:. 
slippage will obviously result in accomplishment of the mission. 
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WHA'T THE STUDY SHOWS .. 
e FEASIBILITY OF THE MISS ION 
e GENERAL MAGNITUDE, SCOPE AND COST OF MISSION 
. . 
•• PROGRAMS AND DEVELOPMENTS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLJSH MISS ION 
. e TIME PHASING OF THE MISS ION AND ITS SUPPORTING COMPONENTS 
e AREAS WHERE EFFORT MUST BE INITIATED OR ACCELERATED TO GENERATE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DATA 
e MAJOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AND ACTIONS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT 
MISS ION 
•• - • - <, 
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PROGRAM SCOPE 
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To give an impression of the over-all scope of the program, the inter-relationship of 
the major events. az-e shot~~_;- fn .figure 2 ~. Thei priil~ipa~· portio~. ·o~· Jtpe·_,_p_rogp~ .a;e/~J1e_.d~yel~P";,,i.:. 
ment of the Nova, the C-3,. the spacecraft and the flight crewo Feeding into the Nova program " 
are its development and launch facilities as well as the development of the F-1 engine. The 
F-1 engine is also important to the C-3 program. Similarly, the required facilities feed in 
to :the· C-3--a'eveiopm~n~'. ·: The. C-1 launch .vehicle is. sl,town "~ein~ u~ed_ i~ the sp~r::_e9!°$'_~t de:v~lop- ,1~ 
ment with the manned orbital flight shown late in 1964. In early 1966, the C-3 is used· -iri "· · 
the spacecraft. development program to launch the Apollo on its manned circumlunar flight. 
D~wn- be_low is shown the Ranger flights. on· Agena, 'the Surveyor fligli_ts on Ge1?,t~ur ; .. bot;:h 
feeding information, to the spacecraft design" and 'dev'elopment concerning' iunar~ char~·cter:i.sti:c's o • il 
Shown at the bottom of the chart are the 18 orbit manned flights,· the ani~l- ·Jlight.s., the 
various biologicai radiation flights, the lunar landing simulations, ;,·the·· iiail'ei;,.manried physio-
logical experiments in.the spacecraft and, finally, the advanced technology area, all of 
which continually feed information in to the development of the spacecraft and/or launch 
vehicles~ '.J,'he. crew .traiili~g: program show~· ~he crew ·,being· pahsed in to. '.tp~ initial . fU,:gh_ts , . 
. . . . )J • . . .' ., ; ... ,. • , .•. ,. ,· .. ·., ·1: of the spacecrafto . . . .. . . ..... , . ' , '• > ' • 
>i. 1. :"1 ;· ~; #.> 
Ultimately, the spacecraft Nova and the flight crew are all ready to accomplish the first 
manned lunar landing in the third quarter of 19670 
Page 8 
f NTE R REL AT I ON S H I P OF M A J O R EV ENT S 
61 62 63 64 65 
NOVA Foci liti ~...;;..D.;;.;ES_l.;;G..;.N..;._ ______ .___ C __ O_N_S_TR..,....UC......,TI ... O....,N...___......., 
F-1 Develop. 
C-3 Develop. 
C-3 Facil. CONSTRUCTION 
C-1 Develop. 
Spacecraft 
Develop. 
18 - Orbrt Manned Fits 
14 - Doy Animal Fits 
Biol. Rad. Satellites 
Luncr S.fc. Simul. Lab. Oper. 
MJltimonned Physidl. Exp. in S/C 
<> <> <> 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
<> 
<> 
I 66 I 
I 
<> 
67 
G) NOVA First Stg Flt 
@ NOVA 2 Stg Flt 
0 NOVA 3 Stg Flt 
© 1st F-1 Eng Deliv . 
© 1st C-3 1st Stg Flt 
© Spacecraft Contr 
Award 
0 Manned Orbital Apollo Flt 
~© Manned Ci rcum-lunar Flight 
© Finalized Crew Tng Plan 
@ Select 1st Group 
of Trainees 
® Designate First 
® Orbital Crews Designate Ft rst 
@ Ctrcumlunar Crew Designate 1st Lunar 
Landing Crews 
~ 1st Manned Lunar 
Landing 
~ 
9 
·.; '. } ' ·, -,, :, 
.. _:.: .. 
.. 1 •• 
• j~ ; 
. ' ... ·.~ ' . '•.·;,.... ..._r:-' 
,.· . 
. ' ' ... ~ 
.• , ........ ··.-· ,. ' - .. 
. .. ,:;;-"' 
,.,_;· . ~ 
"': .;,·· , . .. _ . ., .... ,.,,. 
. ·, 
. .~ ~ 
·;i ... 
·, 
{· ·. 
'' t' 
,.'·, • .. ···· ... 
' " 
~- .~ 
, .. ",'f •• t• ... -·. ,, ._, 
The variOU:g launch requirements, combine to give a flight program of' very large scop~. ' 
Figure 3 i~·a c;omposite of all the:developmerit flights that lead up'to and complete the·· 
mann~d lunar landing mission. Shq~ are early f}ights of the radiation sateilites, Agena 
flights, c;entaiir flights, flights(on the c-1, · c-3 and ~ova. The m;_!;sions _i:nclude .. t:Qe (:arrying 
out of the inVEfstigations· needed· ·to· develop the. spacecraft, the training of the . crews and 
the raunch veJ{icle development f~:i~hts O , ' 
This schedule represents a total of 167 flights plus 26 aircraf,= ··drops •. _Thus· there 
are. approximately 1,75 to· 200 flight operations involved in the P.fOg:raiii· teading up to the 
manned lunar: landing. mission. · 
•. • ·V • 
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MISSION APPROACH 
There are two major types of flight ~issions which precede 
and lead µp to the ultimate manned luna~ landing mission as figure 
4 iilustrat_es ~ First are the manned 'earth orbital flights with 
three men in the capsule. ; These will be followed by :elliptical 
and circumlunar flights. Both types Jialst be performed successfully 
to assure system reliability and the -compatibility of the space-
craft design and the crew. 
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Spacecraft configurations that are proposed to accomplish 
earth orbital and circumlunar flights as well as lunar .landing 
and takeoff are illustrated in figure 5. These configurations 
show one possible arrangement, with the three-manned capsule in 
the forward portion. The aft-portion of the earth orbit and 
circumlunar system is the lunar take-off stage. For all earth 
orbital missions it will be used as the abort system to provide 
more experience with it to insure high reliability. This stage 
would probably use storable propellants. The lunar landing 
stage is a hydrogen oxygen stage probably using two LR-115 
engines. 
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The various· phases of the manned lunar flight are 
_illustrated in the next four figures. 
The flight· plan for the lunar mission is to use-a 
direct ascent to escape velocity wf.th a three-stage bo6st 
as illustrated in figure 6. The spacecraft,- the lunar 
landing stage, the lunar take-off stage are boosted to 
the escape velocity of 25,000 miles an hour. 

One method: of tan«ring on the moon- is shown·· :fn; figure 7 0 
In. this caJe the lunar landlng would· bt! accomplishecl. by backing· 
the vehicle in:and' landing it in the· conventi'ona:f at'rcraft 
attitude. Another approach, would be to land~ the velifcle· 
vertically on-its tail. 

Lunar take-off ts illustrated in figure 8:. The lunar .landing 
stage.is left behind as the lunartake-o.ff st;ag~ launc;hes the 1D411ned 
capsule on' its return trip to ear~h. 
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Finally, after separating from the lunar take-off stage, 
the capsule reenters the earth's atmosphere at 2S,OOO miles an. 
hour, the heat shield preventing the capJule from burning up. 
Recovery is with parachutes in much the same way as the Mercury. 
F~gure 9 illustrates the reentry and landing ,base of the mission. 
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SPACECRAFT REQUIRF.MENTS 
The basic spacecraft·components and their weights are shown in ·figure 10. Two columns 
of spacecraft weights are shown. The one headed "Studies" represents a conservative com-
posite of the results obtained from the three Apollo Study Contractors. The "Allowed" 
column represents the spacecraft weights the study group feels are more realistic for a 
feasible program. In the Contractors' studies, the structure and heat protection, the 
power supply, the crew environment and control system, guidance and control, coxmnunications 
and instrumentation, added up to a total spacecraft weight of about 9,700 pounds. No . 
radiation shielding as.such was included. 
In reviewing the weights, it was believed that those chosen for the supporting systems, 
power supply,:,the crew systems, guidance and communications were reasonable and realistic. 
However, it was believed that about 1,500 pounds should be added for structure and heat 
prot~ction. About. half of this is contingency in structural ·weight, which always has a 
tendency to grow in a system like this. The other half is contingency for the .heat shield 
This is an ·area in which more information is needed in order to know·exactly what the heat 
shield requirements are. To insure a feasible system, it was believed that the addition of 
this 1,500 pounds was quite necessaryo 
For radiation shielding, 1,250 pounds has been added. This shielding might well be 
principally water. In the orginal studies, the contractors·'relied on the structure and 
equipment in the spacecraft to protect the crew from solar radiation. Based on what we 
know today, we feel that this additional shieldin~ might well protect the crew to the 
extent that solar radiation exposure would not ~ceed 25 rem.except during giant solar 
flares •. These giant solar flares occur on the order of once every one to four years~. 
About seven giant flare~ have occurred in the last ten yearso 
With these added contingencies the tot,~l spacecraft weight amounts to 12,500 pounds. 
.,. r~ 
. ":;. 
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SPACECRAFT WEIGHTS 
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Over-all system weights for two missions -- the circumlunar mission and the lunar 
landing mission are shown in figure 11. Of course, in each case, the spacecraft weight.is 
the 12,500 pounds shown in figure 10. There are two propulsion systems, one fot the lunar 
return, and one for abort. For the circumlunar case,· the lunar return system will be used 
for abo.rt propulsion. The size of the tanks and some of the structure will be reduced so 
that the empty weight will be about 2,500 pounds. With 10,000 pounds of storable propellants, 
a total of 25,000 pounds must be placed in an escape trajectory to accomplish the circumlunar ·· · 
mission. 
For the lunar landing mission, it is necessary that the lunar ret4rn stage have .a 
structure of about 5,000 pounds with 37,000 pounds of storable propellants.· The lunar 
landing system requires 14,000 pounds of structure (including the landing gear) and 81,000 · 
pounds of hydrogen and oxygen propellant. Thus, a total of 150,000 pounds must be put ·into 
an escape trajectory to accomplish the manned lunar landing mission. This payload ~stablishes 
the launch vehicle capability requirement for the Nova type vehicle. · 
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The spacecraft development schedule is shown in figure 12. · The three principal components 
are: the manned capsule or reentry vehicle, the lunar return and abort system and the lunar 
landing propulsion system. The solid vertical bars indicate the dates on which the contracts 
must be let .in order to meet the 1967 flight date. 
The reentry vehicle contract is scheduled to be let January 1, 1962. During the coutse 
of vehicle development, information regarding weightlessness will be derived from the 14-day 
animal flights. The Agena reentry flights will give information on heat shield design. Data 
from the biomedical and radiation satellites will check initial assumptions on radiation 
shielding. The spacecraft development will take about 2% years at which time it will be ready 
for launching on the Saturn C-1. 
SiJ!1Ultaneously, a contract should be let· about mid-1962 to develop the lu'{lar return and, 
abort system. It will require about two years of development and will also phase into the 
Saturn C-1 orbital flights that begin near the end of 1964. 
In the latter part of 1962, the contract for the lunar landing propulsion, system develop-;,." 
ment should be iet. During the development of this system, data will be fed in to the spacecraft 
design from the· Surveyor lunar landing missions on the characteristics· of the lunar surface .to . _· 
guide in design of the landing gear system. The Saturn C-1 orbital flights will, in the latter 
part of 1965 or early 1966, phase in to the elliptical or circumlunar flights on the·saturn C=3 
when it becomes ·available early in 1966. Likewise, as soon as the lunar landing pro1n1lsio11 system 
is developed, ballistic flights on the Saturn C-1 will be ·made to.simulate the lunar .. lan~ing .• 
Early in 1967 the spacecraft system is expected to be ready to phase in to the Nov~ for the· 
manned lunar landing mission. · · 
It should be pointed-out that very little study has;gone into preci~ely what oper~Uons. 
would take place on the moon or how they would be executed. Thus considerable·thought"and · 
effort must be devoted to the areas. of lunar landing systems, h,inar surf.ace exploratipn>-(th~ ·:: 
cr~w and· techniques for checkout and launch of the return vehicle. · ·· ·-· 8Y · · : 
' ' ~. • • ; " > • •', ;, 't "'"• I• : ;'.• • -~~ 
It should be notted that the spacecraft will be ready in l967, whereas the lunar ~~ndirtg 
mission would~ in .all probability, not take place until about, the third. quarter of .19.67 ~'·., __ What 
this means is that the spacecraft does not appear to be the. pacing ltem.· NevertheteS's·, it .. is 
extremely important to start the various. spac~craft, components as early as possible to provide 
some ~ime ~or pontingencies. Furthermore, should. the ~ova v~h~cl~ d~velopment move along at 
·. a more promising- rate than anticipated;. it might be' possible 'to use· an earlier -Nova for the 
manned lunar ~ssion! · · 
... -. 
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Closely tied in with the spacecraft development are!the flight crews which are required on 
on the C-1 orbital, C-3 circumlunar and the Nova lunar landing flights. 
-~ 
Figure 13 shows the evolution of the flight crew seJ~ction, training and flight experience. 
It indicates that beginning innnediately, there is a needj:o look at the crew requirements; ¢lat;: .. · 
their composition will be, how they will be selected and, in general, what the training plan is 
going to look like. By the first quarter of 1962, these studies should be completed and the 
training plan defined so that screening of the flight crew candidates can begin. 
Flight crew candidates should be ready on January 1, 1963 for:a year and a half long 
training program. Upon completion of .. this program in mid=l964, they would then .begin to· 
phase in to the manned orbital flights on the C-1 and later, having had experfence here,_ 
would phase in to:, the mam;u~4 circumlunar flights and the lunar landing systems de:veiopment ·' 
flights. Actually tlle crews will have experience in both of these areas: and by' l~te ".l966,. ·· :!!. have had sufficient 'training to be ready to go on the manned lunar landing piissi.on on :; . 
·-
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LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT 
The weight requirements for the missions indicated previously·determine the size of the 
launch vehicles that will be necessary to carry out the programs. The~epayload·requirements 
lead to two launch vehicle families. One is a family of all- liqui~ · propulsion systems, the 
other is a family of vehicles which uses solid propulsion for the·::first stage or first and 
second stages; One of the basic ground rules of the study was that, initially, parallel 
developments of liquid and large solid rockets for the first stages of the C0 3 and Nova 
vehicles would be carried out. 
. . ;,, .. ':; .. 
Figure 14 shows the family of all-liquid vehicles •. The first,vehicle in the ~amily,i~/the 
Saturn C-1. The first stage has 8,H-1 RP-Lox engines, and the upper stage has 6 LR-115 engines 
using liquid hydrogen-~ge~. 
The second vehicle is tlie Saturn C-3. Note that the C=2 is missing· frotti 'thfs :fmnily:: :/;I{,~.· ··· 
does not have sufficient capability to put the 25,000 pounds needed into a circumlunar trajectory. 
The Saturn C-3 has two F-i' engines in the first stage using RP-Lox· and producing three million 
pounds of thrust. The second· stage is a variation of the S=II stage with four.J-2 engi,n~s,~,, ... , ,. 
This veh.icle provides: an: escape velocity payload weight of 30,000 pounds, easily t:a.l<ing- c~r.e ·-'of 
the 25,000 pound _spac,ecraft .requirement. It also provides 80,000 pounds in earth".orb{f; : .. ; 
The thi,rd vehicte, the liquid Nova, has 8 F-i engines ·in the fj.r~t:'stag~,':with:.:t:otat ·~h~s1t"·? , 
. . . ' ~. - . -· ... - ,. . .. ~- . . . ' i . . ..... ~ ".,.. . ..c 
of .12 million pounds. The second stage has 8 J-2 engines using hydrogen~oxygeri" an4,, _pi:a,qucµig . ' 
a ,little over a million and a half pounds of thrust. The third stage is a variatii>n :of :thJ S-II 
stage; having ~nywhe~e from two to four J-2 engines. The fourth s~age is the lunar.landing 
st~ge 'and the ·fifth (ifs the lunar take-off stage. This liquid propellant Nova. wql, place, l~.,.OPQ 
pounds in an ·escape~trajectory. '. $' ' ;·~,:, ·.-.,, .. ,.:.::··· ·>\i ,· '(-~ _; 
· ... ·- ..... ~ ; ~ ·: 
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The family of solid liquid boosters is shown in ~J.~fe 150 Agai1:1, the C-l is a pa
0
rt. of 
this family~ 
The C-3, in this case, has three solid propellant motors in the first stage, each having 
a thrust of a million and a half to two million pounds, giving a total of four and one-half 
to six ~illion pounds thrusto The second and third stages of the solid C~3 are the same as 
those of the all-liquid versiono This again gives the 30,000 pounds excape capability that is 
needed for the circumlunar mission. 
For the solid-liquici Nova, i$= was found,advantageous to use two solid stages in place of 
the first stage of the all-liquid version. The first stage consists of 7 three million pound 
thrust: solid rocket chambers, giying a .total thrust of twenty-one million pounds·; the second 
stage consists of 3 solid rock~ts, each havlng two and one-half to three million pounds thrust, 
giving\.an eight to nine million: pound thrust capability. The third stage is the 8J~2 hydrogen-
oxygeni-stage fpllowed by the S-II stage. This solid Nova also has a 160 9 000 pound\excape 
payload capabi~ity. 
!: 
These, then, are the launch vehicles selected to perform the missioni associated with 
the manned lun~r landing. Included in the launch vehicle development,-but not cove'red on 
later_'developmep.t charts, is a parallel development of an 800,000 to 1,000,000 pourid thrust 
hydrogen-oll)'gen~rocket motor which might be used in the second stage as a backup. A contract 
for the development of this motor should follow along in parallel with the development of 
the J:,2 and the ~development of the upper stages. ', 
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An examination of the development· schedules oi- the C-3 ·and, the-Nova vehicles points out· 
their time phasing and their most .~ritical i;tems pnd indicates,,points when a ·choice might '!>e r ;_;, 
made between the liquid and the s<>fid first is:t'ages:, fot: C-3-"And ·~o:vio: l'Qe: next, severEil. cliarts : ·:< 
show these 4evelopment schedules. ,''Only the :major components of the veh{cles. ind their critical 
supporting items are shown. ,-~: ~ i_ ; C' , i • 'i. r : t ..:' 
~ . . ' ' .. ·• ,._ : !<~·' 4.'! , • -
. Figure 1 16 shows the development· schedule'· for·;tJiErli·qu'id ·c .. 3'. Noted' -1,·y tii~'''s~lfd",r'~tH~tdaf''~>:;:.,: -:..."'">.':-'7J'!. 
- bars, are the action or decision points that are important. One of the most important actions 
is _the i~ediateacceleration of the funding of the F-1 engine production to insure. that; an 
adequate number ?f F-1 engines will be available by the end of 1962 to start assembly of the 
static test article. 
It was found that the facilities are a critical item. In order to have the static test 
stand ready to begin static tests ~n the middle or third quarter of 1963, it is necessary to 
let a contract for the design and construction of the static test stand for the first stage 
of the C-.3 in a minimum of time. This minimum time has been established as 12 weeks. The 
launch complex is also a critical item. A contractor must immediately be brought aboard to 
begin design of t~e launch complex for the liquid C-3 in order that it be available in the 
third quarter of i962 for the first C-3 launch in January 1965. A contract for tqe develop-
.· ment of the first, stage is also necessary early in the schedule so that facility design 
criteria can be e~tablished by the end of this year for the static test stand and launch 
complex, the pacing items in the first stage development. · 
For. t·he secotid stage, the J-2 
accelerated.' so'~alto allow the J-2 
stands. Withithe arrival of these 
begin. Th~ second stage should be 
J . ' ,· 
acceptance stand is a critical item and funding should be 
contractor to immediately begin to build J-2 acceptance 
engines in late 1962, the static test article assembly can 
complete by the end of 1964. 
Three'fi;st 'stages with dummy upper stages will_be launched beginning in e~rly 1965. The 
following three flights in the second quarter of 1965 will be two-stage flights. With'the 
third stage'.devel<>pment completed by early 1965,. the. seventh flight of the C-3 in mid--1965 will 
be a complete tlir·ee-stage flight. ' ., , .. · . ' 
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•, I 
. '' f \; 
I. 
' 
\ LIQUID C-3 VEHICLE DEVELOPME 
-' 
~~ CY 
iFIRST STAGE 
'¥ 
~I 
_;;'!\: 
1,F-J ENGINES 
. ~ . 
STAGE DEVELOPMENT 
S LAUNCHES 
STATIC TEST STAND 
LAUNCH COMPLEX 
SECOND STAGE 
STAGE DEVELOPMENT 
J-2 ACCEPTANCE STAND 
THIRD STAGE 
STAGE DEVELOPMENT 
61 62 63 64 
BEGIN STATIC TEST 
/
ARTICLE ASSEMBLY 
------- BEGIN STATIC TEST 
------- \ · LAUNCH PREPARATION 
FACILITY DESIGN CRITERIA 
/ 
BEGIN STATIC TEST 
ARTICLE ASSEMBLY 
STAGE COMPLETION/ . ·.,·-
STAGE COMPLETION 
·• : >-1 ··, •. ::· 
•• ,1:'' ......... 
65 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 · 200 
; )~~ 
!'.~, 
..-~ 
:~ .. - .. '· 
37. 
The solid C-3 development schedule shown in figure 17 is much the same as that of the 
liquid version. 
The Air Force has indicated they can let a contract for solid motor development about 
September 1, 1961. This would give them a firing of the first boiler plate engines in the 
third quarter of 1962. This boiler plate engine will be a big heavy tank filled with pro-
pellant and having an orifice at oen end. The propellant grain will be ignited to demonstrate 
that.the amount of. propellant in a three million pound thrust rocket motor can be burned 
successfully. Thus, this is really not an engine but rather the burning.of a tremendous grain 
of solid propellant. The engine development must be started at this point·to feed in to the 
C-3 assembly.at the end of 1964. 
Again, the launch complex is a critical item requiring an early start of stage development 
to feed facility design criteria for the design of the static test stand. In this case, the 
requirement is not quit~ as·critical as:with the liquid. c,..3 since the solid propellant stand is 
less complicated as the liquid stand. Of course, the second and third stages of the solid C-3' · 
. are the same as for the liquid C-3. Thus, again, the critical item is the J-2 engine acceptance 
stand. 
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ThediquidnNova development schedule is shown in figure 180 The story is much the same 
as for the C-3o The problem of the F-1 acceptance, initiation of the first stage development, 
provision of early facilities design criteria for the static test stand and launch complex, 
assembly of the Nova test article in early 1963, start. of static test in early 1964, availability 
of the facility for the first Nov,a first stage launch in late 1965, are all interrelated in a 
very critical mannero The two-stage vehicle will be launched in early 1966 and the three-stage 
vehicle in late 19660 Three first-stage Novas, three two-stage Novas and seven three~stage 
development flights are scheduled before Noo 14, which is the vehicle considered sufficiently 
reliable to handle: the first manned lunar landing flighto As mentioned before, should the 
Nova development proceed smoother than anticipated, it is always possible that the first 
manned lunar flight can go on an earlier Novao For example, the spacecraft might well be 
ready for Nova Noo llo 
The small numbers on top of the "F-1 Acceptance Stand" bar are rather significant. These 
numbers represent the number of full duration F-1 engine firings that will b~ completed at 
various times during engine development. This_is the·complete engine with its pumps, valves, 
turbines, etc. Late in 1961 two F-1 firings will have been completed, followed by 13 firings 
by early 1962, nearly 40 by mid-1962 and, by the beginning of 1963 when·assembly of the static 
test article begins, there will have been a,hundred full duration firings of the F-1 engine. 
By that. ·time, it should be well established whether or not the F0 l is going to work. 
In the liquid Nova, as in the C-3, the pacing items are again the large facilities. 
f• 
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Th~usolid-liquid Nova development schedule is shown in figure 19. 
As before, development of solid engines starts early in the program. The solid rocket 
engine phases in to the assembly of the first stage in mid-1964. The launch complex and the 
test stands are again pacing items asdn the other cases. Second stage development will come 
along with that of the first stage 9 making possible four launchings of the first and second 
solid stages togetherll beginning in late 1965. This will be followed with flights of the 
third and fourth stages, which are the same as the second and third stages of the liquid Nova. 
Three firings with the first three stages and seven more firings with all the stages gives a 
total of 14 development flights. Like the all-liquid Nova, the solid-liquid Nova scheduled 
for the first manned lunar flight, No. 15, will be ready in the third quarter of 1967. 
As in the previous figure, the small numbers shown above the top bar indicate the number 
of engine firings. By the third quarter of 1962, the first boiler plate firins..._of a three 
million pound solid rocket chamber will take place. Before static test assembly "starts,.· 
there will have been between ten to fifteen firings of a single three million pound thrust 
rocketll the last ones being prototype solid rocket engines. Once again, the facilities are 
· pacing items. 
An important point needs to be emphasized in connection with the development of the 
launch vehicles. TQere is need to start inunediately an over-all system design analysis. 
The design of the stages comprising the vehicles cannot be started one at a time without' 
serious consideration of the complete·vehicle system. Rather they must be designe~ on ~he 
basis of a relatively extensive performance and structural analysis of the.complete inte-
grated vehicle and spacecraft so as to insure that' the design specifications that are laid 
down for each stage are ·compatible will result ultimately in a feasible and reliable system. 
' : . - A . . 
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The liquid and solid stage dev.elopments can now be compared in an effort to show when 
decisions·can.be made as to whether liquid or solid stages will be ·used for th~ ultimate 
manned lunar ianding'flight on Nova. Figure 2o·repeats the contents ·of earlier charts for 
the first stage development of the liquid Nova and for the first and ·second stage development 
of the sol~d Nova. Various .criticalpoints are indicated. Note that t~e timing of the liquid 
and.the solid Nova is about the same~ The first launch of the first stage of Nova is going 
to come in early 1966 regardless of whethe~ it is liquid ~r solid. Either one can be ready for 
·a manned lunar landing flight in about:the third quarter of 1967. 
. . . ) ' 
J.,ooking at the·over~all costs of the liquid and the solid Nova vehicles, and their 
supporting facilities 9 it is found that the cost comes out about the same·, i.e., one can° t' 
really make a decision on the basis of cost. With regard to reliability, it would certainly 
be impossible to ~ke any guesses because the program requirements stretch both the liquid and 
the·soU.d motor well beyond the present demonstrated state of the art. What th~~ means., then, 
is that a decision nmst be made at some point based on the successes,,,.failures or troubles in 
the development of the liquid or the solid rocket motors. It is more than likely ·. that' an .. 
ol;,vious decision point will not occur in which case the decision must be purely arb~trary. 
The cutoff point or decision point might logically occur at the end o.f a fiscal year. 
At .the end of the first year of the program (mid~l962 and end of FY 62) about 40 full duration 
F-1 runs will have been made. This should give a good indication as to whether the. F;ls ar'e · ". 
either very good or very poor. By this time both the liquid and solid first stage design has 
begun but the first solid motor run has yet to be_ made. A decision at this point could in all 
probability only be arbitrary. ,. · · · · · · · 
A yea:t later (mic:1~1963), · there will have been over 100 F=l full duration_ ~ns and ~ssqmbly ,· 
of the liquid first stage st~tic. test article will have .. be~n. In the s.olid case; · about 5 full · 
scale. single motor runs will have. been made an4 the first stage design will have progressed 
fairly well. along towards fabrication ·of hamware. A decision might be made here. if efther' ~he·· 
liqui4 or the solid ilooks eithe:r~ extre1;0ely good or extremely bado ·--· .- .. ~ ·· 
At th~ end\Qf·the third fiscal year (inid-1964), the-~li~id Nova static,t.~~tJ~,wil:J.·.,h,v~,..p~gun, 
giving a very gopd id,ea as t.o whether. or not it will be successful. Also 19·-·1:o 15"solid motor~:' 
d~velopment runs· will have been completed and the fabrication of the solid stage will be well . 
along. Certainly by this point a logical decision can be·.made. However·, a-,4e~hio~ atj- .th~s ... ,. : 
time ;will be Dltich -;too/late~ $ince· most of the money for the large developmerit.t.:Art,;t· 1,,un~hLf- .· .. ,,:.:-.:-~-~ 
facilities __ ,~ll have been sp~~t. a~~- su~h __ facilities will be either compl~ted or approaching 
their completion . . . i . ·: ,r:.411 (C, '. ;· ... ::: -1 -: ·'., z\. "T;? 
' ~.... 0 • - •F ·~ .~; ~. j I l sf; • ...,_£.. "-• - • ,..J ·" , .J, .... ~ - ->• ! • T~ 
·~.·. 
Page 44 
•• j~ 
, ... ~ ,~ ... 
NOV A DECISION- POINTS 
. CALENDAR YEAR 
..• 
.-;. . · F~l ACCEPTANCE STAND . 
,-r.~ 
STAGE DEVELOPMENT 
STATIC TEST STAND 
LAUNCH COMPLEX 
§OLIO NOVA 
SOLID. MOTORS DEL1D 
1st ST AGE DEVELOPMENT· 
TEST STAND 
LAUNCH COMP LEX 
2nd ST AGE DEVELOPMENT 
102 BEGIN STATIC 
------ TEST ARTICLE 
FACILITY 
DESIGN 
CRITERIA 
ASSEMBLY . BEGIN STATIC LAUNCH 
TEST PREPARATION 
FACILITY 
DESIGN CRITERIA 
FIRST BOILERPLATE FIRING 
5 10 
STAND COMPL, 
BEGIN STATIC 
TEST 
--- STAGE COMPLETION 
·:45 
-
' : :_- : 
"·'· 
While the parallel liquid and solid stage developments are being carried out, funds are 
pouring into static test stands and into launch complexes for both programs. What it means to 
delay this decision from year to year in terms of dollars is shown in figure 21 •. 
The chart compare.a. the liquid and solid Nova first stage development costs. The figures · 
are cumulative costs in millions of dollars against the fiscal year points that have been 
mentioned above with the liquid and solid programs carried along together. ·These'costs 
represent the costs of the liquid and solid stages and their development and launch facilities. 
Combined costs are represented by the solid curve. If a decision is made at the end of the 
first year to go liquid ·or solid 11 subsequent costs would go along the lowest dotted curve. 
Likewise, if the decision between liquids and solids were made at the end of the second fiscal 
year, the cost would proceed along.the middle dotted curve and, finally, a third year decision 
would involve costs along the upper dotted curve. 
. . 
The important point is that ~he difference in cost between the first and the second year. 
·. of carrying along parallel developments will be about 400 million dollars; if the decision 
is delayed from the second ye&:r to the third_year 11 it will cost an additional 550 million dollars. 
Thus parallel development of liquids and solids to mid-1964 will cost in excess of one billion. 
dollars more than pursuing only a single approach from the start. Nevertheless, both approaches 
should be pursued at this time, although it would be less costly to select 9n~ as the primary 
system and carr:y the other along as a backup. 
t '. 
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FACILITIES 
The next several charts deal.with the facilities which are required to support a program 
of this magnitude. There are many and varied kinds of facilities ne~ded ·for launch, for develop0 
ment and for supporting programs. The detailed report treats the entire facilities requirementso 
This suIIllll8ry report will dwell on the launch facilities only. The launch facilities are really 
the major and the cr,itical facilities and are the facilities in which there exist the greatest 
unknownso : 
Perhaps the greatest problem associated with laµnch facilities for very large launch vehicles 
has to do with noise level. Figure 22 illustrates this problemo The sound pressure level in 
decib~ls is plotted against distance in miles on a logarithmic scale. The bottom line r.epresents 
the sound pressure level' versus distance as measured by MSFC for the Saturn operating at 1.3 
million pounds thrust. Extrapolated from these data are curves for a million and a half pounds, 
three million, 12 million and 20 million pound thrusts. Twelve million pound thrust corresponds 
to the all=.liquid Nova, the 20 million pound thrust corresponds approximately to ~the liquid= 
solid Novao There is estimated to be about 3 decibel difference in sound level between·the 12 
and 20 million pound thrustso The chart ·shows three i~portant sound levels: abo,re 140 db 
causes damage to heari~gp 135 db is the threshold of pain, from 135 db down to 115 db is the 
maximum exposure area i~ a co~trolled zone. 
There are certain.gwund rules associated with noise which Dllllst be observedo One of the 
ground rules tli~t the Air Force and NASA have jointly reconnnended is that the goyernment will 
own or will have noise easement,s .on al_l real estate where the noise level during7;launch will be 
115 db or higher. This·. is the significance .of t~e limit of the control zone. Between. 115 and 
120 db is an area where· those people occupying the area will be warned of an eve1',t .•.. They would 
use ear plugs but it would'·b~-. safe for them .. to be out=of~doors. The noise level ~W9Uld be about 
equivalent to a freight train· rushing by ~t ·very close proximity. From 120 to 135 db is _the 
real control area where, during tlie iaunch, movement of personn~l wou:ldf;hav~ .to b~ controlled 
and all personnel would have to be inside buildings o This does n9t 'tn~~ .. ·'.tluit they would have to 
be inside'of dugouts, etco, it just mearuPi~ide of,{a building to cut.the noise level down to 
. ' ~-- ~. . . below 120 db and perhaps 115 db or lower. The···a,;ea above 135 db would ]?e complet;ely evacuated. 
In the .case of the liquid Nova this would be an area-: j.i:,.' r.adiu~i:.pf about,:(?n~ milei for the solid 
Nova it would be 1-\'miles from the launch siteo At 150 db~ ·which is:slightly off the top of 
the curve, structural damage·starts, ioeo, the brick and mortir~~~gins to fall apart. However, 
150 db occurs very close to the launch pad and anything designed or~built,,J~-.this area would be 
built tor-withs·tand • these very high noise pressure levels o .. · . , · . . . • . ~ , ~ .. :s·,,;o:-:,-.:,; 
; :"'~~::· . --_::.':~· 
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It is to be noted that there has been a system hazard analysis of large vehicle 
systems made by a board composed of members from AMR; from the AF Space Systems 
Division and from the NASA Launch Operations Directorate. This group has defined 
regulations for this control zone and made joint facility recommendations. Several 
launch sites based on the· board's reconunendations have been considered. These are-
shown in the following charts. 
Figure 23 shows a map of AMR with,possible launch sites for C-3 and Nova. The 
map shows the present northern limit of AMR·real estate and the present AMR complex. 
Three C-3 launch pads could be established as.shown near the top part of the map. 
Nova launch pads could be located a short distance below the C-3 pads. Shown on the 
figure are areas denoting the region of 115 db noise level. In accordance .with 
current recommendations, the government would have to own ·J;:he real estate or have 
noise easements within the outermost arc to launch Nova from AMR. The 120 db line 
for the Nova launch pad would cut mid-way acro~s the cape. This means that through-
out the lower half of the AMR complex personnel can •continue_ to work out-of-doors 
unhampered but probably using ear plugs. Over the northern half of the AMR-complex, 
all of the personnel would have to be controlled, i.e., they have to be indoors- but 
could continue to occupy the buildings in this area. 
There are -approximately one thousand property owners and a population of over 
a thousand in the area that would .have to be acquired north and west of AMR. However, 
the Air Force and NASA personnel at AMR are beginning to look into the problems involved 
in proce'dures needed to acquire this land. 
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Another variation of the C-3 "4Dd.~Nava,.,launeh::sites:-;1e-,:rshown:'i.9,-·f·igU,te 240 
The C-3 _pads are at the northern t~p of the Banana River, the Nova pads are 
offshore on land fill. The 12 million pound thru.st liquid Nova pads are closer 
in and the 22 million pound thrust solid Nova pads further out. From the liquid 
Nova pads, the 115 db arc shown does not cover nearly as much land area as in the 
previous case. The 12Q db line -for the Nova would extend only to the vicinity <?f 
the C-3 pads. ' 
Two important points should be noted. The first refers to the separateness 
of solid and liquid Nova pads ·and the second refers to choice of relative 
locations. With regard to the first, studies by the Launch Facilities Group of 
the study conunittee indicated that the hardware required for the two.vehicles is 
so different that to design and build launch pads for the use· of either solid or 
liquid Novas would. result in facilities not very good for either one. With · 
regard to the second, the particular water sites chosen are shallows with deeper 
water in between.; Since large scale· land fill is involved., the. cost would mount 
in deeper water. If the solid Nova were in the vicinity of the liquid Nova pads, 
the 115 db line associated with their firings would extend-as far inland as that 
of the liquid Nova from the land site of Figure 23. 
One point can be made with regard to these offshore laun_ches: the pads 
would be subject to overflights from time to time from .la.rid launches. This is .. 
· a situation that both NASA and theAir Force have tried to avoid whe~ever tJ::tey. 
could. ! 
·,; ... ·"".- ' 
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There are alternate possibilities, besides AMR, for launching the largeveliicles. One 
of .the most promising is shown in Figure 25. This is ·the King's Bay area along the Georgia 
coast.· King's Bay is about 50 or 60 miles north of Jacksonville, Florida. There are two 
or three little towns eight miles or so from an island known as Cumberland Island. Close 
by is King's Bay Army Air Terminal, a little arsenal. that is pretty well abandoned. Cumber-
land Island is owned by three different parties. Docking facilities are av~ifable at the 
King's Bay Army Terminal. · 
It would be possible to establish Nova launch sites along Cumberland Island. These 
would be about eight mil~s from the .Jekyll State Park, 118 miles from Brunswick and. about 
8 miles from St .. Mary's. T~e 120 db line would run along·as shown in the-''blow-up" if 
the launch pads were extended from essentially .one end to the other of Ciµnberland Island. 
However, if the launch pads are concentrated in the center of the island as shown, the 
115 db line would just about hit Jekyll State Park and come just up to the little town 
of St. Mary's. North of -the Army terminal is swampland, but ·there wQutd· be some real 
,estate which must. be acquired in addition to Cumberland Island. .CeTtain facilities must 
be provided, such as launch and initial tracking· facilities, a_s well as. support facilifies. 
These already exist at AMR. · .. 
There are a number of other~:possible s{tes. Op.itii~:ms·. ·regarding good sites range to 
islands all the way ·out to Hawaii. These will not be discussed: here. However' a serious 
and intense effort is needed immediately on this problem of site survey fo determine':the 
best place· from ·which to launch the C-3 's ·· and Novas, particularly the Novas. 
Secondly, a very real need exis_ts for additional noise data~ The noise data shown 
in Figure 22· are somewhat preliminary. They are· more conse~ative lhan some contract:e>rs/ 
e.g., No:rth American, ha.s shown, particularly' for· the sold rockets·. Continuing investi-,·~ 
gations niu~t be carried out to d,etermine noise ·levels for som~~·:of lthe big Nbva vehic:kesf 
Better nois~ data ·a_nd better extrapolation techniques are needed so t~t th,e :a~Ollnt ,?.f,; 
isolai:;on really needed for· the launch· sites· can be determined. ~; \ , .;· } 
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Besides the lau~ch site, there is also.the problem of the launch 
complex. Figure 26 shows one possible way of handling the Saturn C-3. 
Here is shown what'--may" be termed the vertical assembly building and 
launch control center. This is a building that stands about 400 feet 
high, b~ck over a mile from the launch site •. Th~ complete vehicle is 
assembled in here, along with its umbilical tower, and completely 
checked out. The control center or blockhouse would be in back of the 
picture and the vehicle would be completely readied for flight in ·the 
front. 
.t 
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. Figure 27 shows the complete layout of the C-3 complex. The building 
of the previous figure would be located on land fill in the Banana River 
as shown. There would then be required perhaps three relatively_simple 
C-3 pads. The vehicle all checked out and in its vertical position, along 
with its umbilical tower, would be transported to the pad either along a 
rail or barge canal. It can essentially' be ''plugged in" and launched· in 
a very few days. All of the control data would. be transmitted from the pad 
back to the blockheµse or ·control center with digital type means .. With 
a system of this· sor·t~, a launch rate of 20 or 30 vehicles per year could 
be achieved. 
. ~ . ~·· 
L .. N0.39 . 
COMPLEX LAYOUT 
-The Nova launch facility illustrated in Figure.28 can be.an on-shore or 
off-shore facility. It looks most feasible and most realistic to assemble the 
vehicles on the stand. To build the vehicle in a remote -site anq-m6ve it-to 
its- stand, as is suggested for the C-3, would·-make operations very costly. The 
cost of the assembly building for the Nova type vehicle is more .than the cost 
of the pads themselves. Fora relatively low firing rate., say.one every one to 
two months., -it is cheaper to build the ·vehicles on the pado Only for a more 
rapid firing rate of., say., one~ a week or once every two weeks., may it be 
cheaper to have the assembly building and not have to fund quite so many padso 
For assembly on the pads,·there is need for a large hurricane proof structure 
around the facility which; prior to launch., ·would break in half and each half 
move back about a thousand feeto For the off-shore case., where land fill is 
required., this means that a land fill with a minimum length on the order of a 
half mile is required to accommodate this equipmento 
- ) 
· One other point can- be made wi.th regard to assembly Or?, the stand versus 
assembly in the control assembly building·~ · The liquid Nova launch vehicle may 
be assembled in a central assembly building., even though it. would be extremely 
difficult because of the 350 feet heighto There is currently some uncertainty 
as to whether it can be done at all by any practica.1-meanso In.the case of the 
. solid Nova., however., where the first and second stages are-fully loaded with 
propellant., the weight is so great that it is impossible to build-the whole 
thing up and transport it five or ten miles to the pado The-so.lid Novas would 
thus have to be built on the pads o · -._ · 
There are many other facilities required in- the program.-·--~,-'i1.here,~re/ .. 
as shown in earlier charts., engine and vehicle test and development facilitl"es;,' 
eog.., deep space networks~ recovery systems., etco There are research .~d .adyan-
ced tec.hn916gy facilities ~hat are required to provide th_e_. data necessary .to· 
accompl.+sh this programo In· many areas these facili tiel;l>'.·are a pacing i tern as 
they were -in the launch vehicle area. It is found that/a number of these facili-
ties should be- started earlym the program. They sh9il:ld be funded during the 
first year of the program. ·· '.Ihese will be discussed-.'!cirther in the sections on 
facility fundingo ,:_:;/ 
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SUPPORTING RESEARCH 
The spacecraft, the launch vehicle, the facilities, and.the crew 
are the central elements of the program, but in addition there are many 
supporting items that are required to develop these major elementso These 
supporting items include the biomedical program, the lunar program, the 
radiation satellite program and the research program, all of which will be 
discussed brieflyo 
Biomedical Program - In the biomedical area, there are two real 
unlmowhso The-first unlmown is the effect of prolonged weightlessness on 
human beings; the second is the effect on man of radiation of the type, 
duration and intensity that might be experienced in lunar flighto 
There are several types of radiationo There is cosmic radiation 
which comes from solar disturbanceso There are the·types of radiation that 
will be encountered in the radiation belt around the eartho Then there are 
_ the heavy, high energy particles that come from intergalactic space· and are 
extremely difficult to protect againsto More must be learned about their 
effects on living tissue and on the human beingo 
To learn abput some of these things, a human and biomedical program 
has been laid out as shown in Figure 290 · It is broken into two portions, the 
weightlessness portion and the radiation portiono In the case of weightless-
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ness; there is indicated by year when data will be obtained for various durationso 
Of course, one flight of- ·five minutes of weightlessness has already been made with 
the Me~-Redstone and more are scheduled thrqughout the yearo Beginninglate 
this ;year~ the first three...-orbit animal flights are- scheduledo Three-orbit· -(4} 
hours) manned flights in Mercury extend through 19620 At the end of 1962, animal 
flights will be made, followed by manned flights for durations of 27 hours in a 
modified Mercury· capsuleo Thus, data will be available on the effects of weight~ 
lessness up to 27 hours·~ In late 1962 and 1963, with a modified Mercury capsule, 
animal·flights will be made varying from two to fourteen days" Beginning late 
in 1964, manned flights with C-ls and·+ater with C-3s in orbital and circumlunar 
missions will gather data on the effects of two to fourteen days of weightless-
ness on man before the actual Nova flights to the moon" This describes the 
general buildup of experience expected in the area of weightlessness" 
- -
In the case of radiation, considering cosmic particles,g there is currently . ·. ·. 
an on~going program of about four balloon launches per year from Fto Churchillo 
There is also an on.:.going program which is expected to continue probing the · 
inner belt protons; this is. the extension of the NERV program with recoverable 
emulsions" Also$ a satellite is proposed to be built which can orbit in the 
,inner belt for periods of up to ten hours and be recovered" It is also designed 
to spend up to twelve days in an elliptical orbit which will take ·it out to an : · 
apogee of some 50 to 60 thousand miles" This spacecraft would be in the order· -· · 
of 2,500 to 3,000 poundso It might possibly be a variation of the Mercury capsuleo 
"!' 64 "". ' ''l 
If this appears -unfeasible a new capsule will have to be- designed. · The Offi·ce 
of Life Sciences Programs is currently looking into the possibility of launch~-
ing a Discoverer experiment in cooperation with the Air Force before mid-1962. 
This experiment will be launched to an apogee of 2,000 miles with mice and 
other small life specimens aboard to ge.t some information on-the inner.belt' 
protons.·. .These data could then be fed into the spacecraft development at · an 
early date. · 
It is very urgent that these programs be implemented., particularly in. 
the radiation area which is a real unknown. This will verify at the earliest 
possible date the assumptions that are being made in terms of the protection 
required in the spacecraft for the crews going on the lunar missions.· 
It is necessary, likewise., to continue gathering data on weightlessness 
to make certain that., if artificial gravity is needed., the spacecraft design 
can be so altered at the earliest possible date. 
- 65 -
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-solar and Radiation Satellites - Figure 30 shows, the program for geophysical 
and solar observations which are necessary to support the primary missiono The 
program is divided int0 three principal areas:· Radiation-belt satellites., the 
solar observatories, and the sounding rocketso The flights indicated in the 
figure are additions to the present programs which are believed to be inadequateo 
In ~ssence., the flights that are indicated for the radiation belt satellites and 
the solar observatories approximately double the flight effort in these two areas 
to insure that an operating radiation satellite and an operating solar observatory 
are orbiting at all timeso . 
The S-3 type satellites start off the radiation experiments followed by 
the eccentric geophysical·observatories (EGO)~ The latter·will be larger and 
carry even more experimentso The purpose\of these radiation satellites is to 
detect continually what is happen$~ in the radiation belts o So far, the· radi·a-
tion belt has not changed much since it was discovered, but that is not to say 
that it wi~l remain constant during the next few yearso .. 
There is a continuing program of solar observator:1,.eso :These sateilites . 
gather data on solar activity which will be useful in predicting solar flares 
and in correlations with the radiation satellite data to indicate the relation-
ship betwe~n .. solar .. act~vity and the observed radiation level. · 
The sounding rocket ~rogram consists of the Nike-Cajun solar· flare ·schinding : 
rocket on an approximately twelve per year available basis should a solar flare 
occuro These will obtain solar flare data with recoverable emulsionso The 
radiation belt satellites., due to the eccentricity and the inclination of their 
orbits, do not always pass through the radiation belt. To get to the heart of 
the radiation belt, the Journeyman sounding rockets will be used at the rate of 
about four per year with recoverable emulsionso 
All of these are important supporting programs that require emphasis and 
accel~ration. 
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Unmanned Lunar Program - The unmanned lunar program has four parts, as shown 
in Figure 31. These are: the radiation environment in space, unmanned lunar 
exploration giving preliminary information about the moon, lunar landing site 
surveys and, finally, actual operational support of the manned mission with the 
lunar spacecraft. The program thus .. consists ·or Rangers I and II, followed by 
the Mariners. The gap'in the Mariner program is filled by two more proposed 
Ranger I·· and II flights. The purpose of these flights is to provide radiation 
data in deep space out welJ. be;yond the~earth's magnetic field to indicate the 
radiation environment in the ;'•tire cislunar space. 
For initial unmanned lunar exploration, the Ranger capsules are usedo 
These are followed late~ in 1963 by the Surveyor soft lander and, in mid-1964, 
by the Surveyor lunar orbiters. The orbiters will survey in more detail the 
landing sites. A current requirement fqr the landing site is an area of ten 
miles by 300 miles that is 'free from any vertical obstructions higher than 
50 feet. With the Surveyor lander and 6,rbiter, some of the smooth spots on the 
~can be surveyed in an attempt to-lay_ out these siteso 
- / ;,: 
The Prospector is considered to be a large bus which can be used to trans-, 
por.t anything from instruments to equipment to support the manned flight to 
the moono The Prospector would be launc_h'ed by the C-3 and transport a useful · 
payload of between 3,000 and 4,000 pounds)to the moon. It is proposed that the 
Prospector flights begin in mid-1965. Of ,course, the early flights would really 
be for developing the Prospector spacecraft. Since they would be launched well· 
before any men would be on the moon, their/ payload would consist of scientif:l;.c '. 
instruments and instruments to aid in furt~er laying out the lunar#;landing<.s~t~.· ·: 
It is difficult to determine at this time what the equipment shoula be. This·· .... 
really has to be defined and it is som~hii\g which must be done soon. Prospector 
is an important part of the program because\by mid-1967 it will be used to trans-
port items· to th~ _moon which will support mcti,nned exploration. It is vecy li~ely_ .. 
that, if not in the first flight, at least in later flights the men a~e, going- to_·. 
need some kind-of ground transportation -- $mall machines which'will give them a_· 
limited range of ac·tion on the surfaoe of the moono They are going to need . 
additional oxygen as well as other life .. support equipment. They· may well want · 
structures that they can b9lt together easily and live a little more comfortably 
than they can live in the capsule if they are to extend their stay on the moon •. 
Thus, the Prospector is an important part .of the program, and even though the:::·:.· . 
Nova can be used for transport&ticm, it appears to be much too la~ge to t~a:nsport 
the types of things needed for life support. The real Justificat·ion, then, for 
Prospector is that it can be used to support an operati,'.ng manned )nission on the 
moon. · __ -~' 
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UNMANNED L61'JAft¥LIGHT PROGRAM 
SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
RANGER I, 2, 10, 11 
MARINER Aas* 
UN.MANNED LUNAR 
EXPLORATION 
RANGER (CAPSULES, 
IMPACTS) 
SURVEYOR (LANDER) 
LUNAR LANDING SITE 
SURVEYS 
SURVEYOR (LANDER a 
ORBITER) 
PROSPECTOR· 
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 
OF MANNED EXPLORA-
TION 
PROSPECTOR 
61 62 63 64 
* PART OF PLANETARY PROGRAM, FUNDED SEPARATELY 
65 66 67 
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Advanced Research - The advanced research and technology effort is geared to 
develop the information needed in designing the spacecraft and launch vehicles. 
Some of these critical areas are itemized in'Figure 32. 
The reentry heating, structures, materials and aerodynamics research will give 
a broad base on which to establish the design of the v~hicles and spacecrafto 
Secondly, navigation, guidance and control research will aid in developing 
improved accuracy and improved reliabilityo Injection guidance is well develop~d 
but much better definition of the system adequacy and the instrumentation is· 
needed for midcourse controlo 
Radiation·and shielding is associated with the effects of radiation on inorgan-
ic materials, on electronic equipment, the characteristics of materials making· up 
the structure, etco 
. . 
The next item listed, lunar landing techniques, propulsion, guidance (including 
the piloting problems), is a wide open.fieldo There is a real need to define some 
of the problems in this areao 
Launch vehicle design .and structural dynamics and control involve consideration 
of windshear problems, in-flight loads, system dynamics, launching and in-flight 
forces, stage separation, etco Basic and fundamental data and desigp rules are,· .. 
needed to allow design of complete systems with much higher reliability ahd c·ept,ait}ty 
of successful operationo '· ~ 
With regard to noise and explosion hazards, data are really meager in.the.very_ 
high noise energy levels of the sort generated by large vehicleso · 
The importance of the work in these areas cannot be overemphasized~··,· New- prb-1'. ~ 
grams must-be established and curr~nt programs accelerated in order to develop the 
necessary information in a timely and useful manner. There are, of course, many , ... 
other .research ·and technological pro}:?lems of a lesser nature which· mµst _also be."~,;· , 
pursued on an a:ccelerated basis in ·order to provide the early in,f'orztla,tj;9_1) -ne)i!d.¢:dt\to ,;_ .. , 
per.fo:rm the basic mission successfully. · ·· · · ~·~<:, : 
-~ 
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ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
CRITICAL AREAS 
• REENTRY HEATING, STRUCTURES AND MATE'RIALS, 
AERODYNAMICS 
• NAVIGATION, GUIDANCE, AND CONTROL 
e· RADIATION AND SHIELDfNG 
•· LUNAR LANDING TECHNIQUES, PROPULSION, GUIDANCE 
( INCLUDING PILOTING PROBLEMS) 
. . - . . - . 
• LAU.NCH VEHICLE DESIGN., s·TRUCTURAL DYNAMICS, AND 
CONTR.OL · 
. . 
• NO'.IS.~ AND EXPLO.SJON H-AZAR.DS ·.· 
' ~· ~· . . . ' -~ ' 
. :' ~"', ,., 
~r ... ~ 
;~~ . 
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EARLY MANAGEMENT ACTIONS REQUIRED 
-·-· -·-. 
A·vast and complicated program such as this has a large number of interacting 
componentso It also has a very large'number of unknown areas that must .be explored. 
It is going to require a very.large, well coordinated and energetic effort to get 
the job done successfully in the shortest possible timeo In order to implement 
the program at the earliest possible date, there are a number of important manage-
ment actions anddecisions that must be made during the first six months of the 
programo Figure 33 summarizes these in an effortto help point the way to getting 
the program startedo 
The first action is an obvious one: NASA must assign program management and 
system responsibility. 
With regard to the spacecraft, several actions are necessary: Atlas Agena-B 
vehicles must be contracted for to· conduct reentry tests. to obtain reentry heating 
data --for spacecraft heat shield design, an A&E contract· must be initiated for a 
space.flight center'and its accompanying spacecraft test and development equipment, 
a contract -for a new tracking station in South America must be let for .the 18 o_rbit 
flights, the Apollo contract must be let, and the.crew selection and training plan 
must be establishedo . ' ' ' 
Regarding the launch vehicle, the following actions .are neededo. - First.,; . com-
plet·e preliminacy overall systems design and integration studies must be madeo 
This is the po·int made previously: that studies directed .toward ·complete system 
design are ne.eded which will lay down .the design specifications and the design 
criteria for the individual stageso\ -Second, accelerate the F-1 engine fundingo t. 
Third, contract for the C-3 first stage developmento This involves the first 
stage development for· both the liquid and the solid C-3o Fourth, cont·ra:ct· fop 
· the development of the .liquid and ',solid Nova .first stages_o Even though, the first 
Nova flight is about one year behind the first C-3 flight, it.requires that 
additi:onal.year ·for design and development. Fifth and "finally, contract fo.r 
the Nova solid ,motor development. Sirice this, de:velopment · has ··been.·.~ssigned:-·as .,:; 
an ·Air Force·-~respons1b111ty, ·contract .will be Tet ·by the 'Air Force~ .. ·" '. ''-"' 
·7.2 _..; 
a s :: :SE!till2 
MAJOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AND· ACTIONS 
REQUIRED "DURING. FIRST 6 MONTHS OF PROGRAM 
PROGRAM 
I 
• ASSIGN PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY • 
. SP.AC E_C RAFT 
• CONTRACT FOR. ATLAS AGENA-B MODEL REENTRY TESTS. 
• INITIATE A&E CONTRACT FOR SPACE FLIGHT CENTER ANO EQUIPMENT. 
• CONTRACT FOR 18 ORB IT TRACKING STATION. 
• LET "APOLLO CONTRACT. 
• ESTABLISH FLIGHT CREW MAKE-UP, SELECTION TECHNIQUES AND GENERAL 
TRAINING PLAN. 
LAUNCH VEHICLES !X' ; 
)·:. 
- • COMPLETE PRELIMINARY OVER-ALL SYSTEMS DESIGN AND INTEGRATION STUDIES. f 
• ACCELERATE F-1 ENGINE FUNDING. 
• LET CONTRACT FOR C-3 FIRST STAGE DEVELOPMENT (LIQUID AND SOLID). -~-""} . ,;: , . 
...;· ,'. 
,·..;: 
_ ... :.~ 
• LET CONTRACT FOR NOVA FIRST ST AGE DEVELOPMENT (LIQUID & SOLi D STAGES-). f( 
./6,~ 
• LET CONTRACT FOR NOVA SOLID MOTOR DEVELOPMENT. 
251 Ji .ELI Jill IS 73 
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- -with regard to facilities., there are many separate actions to be takeno 
Basically., management must examine the needs carefully and initiate the support 
and construction necessary on an urgent basis to provide schedule implementation 
of this pacing element of the programo -
In the area of supporting technology, there are six important actions needed 
in the first sixmonthso First, the biomedical satellite program must be initiatedo 
This is the 2,500 to 3,000 pound satellite that will go into the inner and-outer 
radiation be.Its and be recoverableo Second, the 18 orbit Mercury flights must pe 
fundedo Third, contract for spac~craft modifications for the fourteen day_animal 
flight must be let~ Fourth, go-ahead on the development of Prospector must be 
giveno This .is not the funding., there is considerable in-house planning required 
before money need be assigned to the systemo Fifth., accelerate the funding for-
the radiation satellite programo Sixth and finally, to provi<ie timely-techno-
logical support the advanced research programs must be acceleratedo ·' 
The accomplishment of the manned lunar landing mission in this decade is 
going to be a tremendous technological monument of our timeo It is gqing to 
require the utmost care in selecting the proper course of' action to insure its 
successful completion in the shortest length of timeo 
. . . . .,. ~ . 
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FACILITIES 
MAJOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AND ACTIONS 
REQUIRED DURING FIRST 6 MONTHS OF PROGRAM 
( GONT I NUED ) 
• INITIATE FACILITIES TO SUPPORT PROGRAM. 
SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY 
• INITIATE BIOMEDICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM. 
• FUND 18 ORB IT MERCURY FLIGHTS. 
FEtiF:SFD:Uftl 
• LET SPACECRAFT MODIFICATION CONTRACT FOR 14-D.AY ANIMAL FLIGHTS. 
• GIVE GO-AHEAD ON DEVELOPMENT OF PROSPECTOR PROGRAM. 
• ACCELERATE FUNDING FOR RADIATION SATELLITE PROGRAMS ... 
• INITIATE· AND AC.CELERATE SUPPORTING RESEARCH 'PROGRAMS. 
--;, 
. <t l JclPJZ 21 ti Jill 
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PROGRAM FUNDING 
The last nine figures present the cost aspects of the program. Figure 35 
shows the elements of the NASA proffiram associated with thenia.nned Iuna.r-lariding · 
mission. This list comprises.the budget package" ·considered ih the program cost. 
It includes the urunanned lunar program in toto, that ·is; the Ranger;·· surveyor ·· and 
Prospectoro Additional radiation satellites and·soundihg rockets· over.arid above 
what had normally been planned are included. The·entire-saturn··c-1 program~ the C-3 
and the liquid Nova, with all their supporting·. facilities· and launch pads, are in 
the package. The total F-1, J~2 and the Y~l ·engine (the new 800,000 to one million 
poWl.d thrust liquid hydrogen engine) development are .. included. The Y-1 is in the 
program primarily as a backup but it will be needed probably for .. future launch ve-
hicles as well. The Mercury follow-on, that is, the 18 orbit and·l4 day animal pro-
iram, the total Apollo program, most of the Life Sciences program, are ~11 in the 
budget packag~." The latter includes ·the riew recoverable bio-satellite which is as 
yet undefined; it may be a ·new spacecraft or a modification of an exist:tng capsule, 
such as Mercury. The new manned space flight center·and accelerated advanced tech-
nology programs a.re included. This last does not include all of the NASA advanced 
technology but that accelerated.portion needed in the early part of the decade to 
accomplish ma.n_ned lunar landing. 
The "budget package" presented does not include ·solid rocket engine and stage 
development, support or facilities although these have been priced. It does include 
launch site A&E for vehicle configurations using solid booster·. s~ages. It does not 
include o~bital rendezvous which is considered a necessary but separate program. It 
does not include in-house S&E and Support of Plant. It does not include new Atlas· 
launch pads which may be found necessary for the Agena and Centaur program presented 
ea.I'lier. .. 
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SPECIAL ST,UDY T.ASK 
MANNED LUNAR PROGRAM BUDGET PACKAGE 
INCLUDES 
. • UNMANNED LUNAR PROGRAM 
• NEW RADIATION SATELLITES AND. ROCKETS 
. •. SATURN C-1, SATURN C-3, _ NOVA 11. 
•· F-1, J-2 AND Y-1 ENGINES 
• MER CU RY FOLLOW-ON 
• 'APOLLO 
. - • LIFE' SCIENCES - BIOSATELLITE 
• NEW MANNED SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 
I • • ' 
• ACCELERATE'D ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
DOES . NOT IN CtUDE 
. • SOLID ·ROCKET ENGINE, STAGES AND SUPPORT 
• ORB ITAL .RENDEZVOUS.: 
' ' -.~ • • ' '. . • • : • - - . - . • i_ ' 
·· • IN-:-HOUSE S&E. 'A,ND: SUPPORT OF. PLANT. 
'·• ATLAS LAUNCH 'PADS ···,·. ' . 
.: ~- ~' . : .. ' . : . . . '·: :: . . . ' '•, ' . ,',, . ~. . . . 
•l;,• 
~' ',, 
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Figure 36 shows the budget guidelines or assumptions under which the.budget was 
drawn up. 
The first assumption is that a strong management group will be formed which has 
adequate authority to make the· proper decisions and move fast in implementing the pro-
gram. 
Secondly, with regard to procedures, Armed Services Procurement Regulations 
(ASPR) have been used throughouto This means there is no assumption of any change 
in our regular business procedureo .However, there is freer use of letter contracts 
than in the past o 
Third, manufacturing and much of the de sigh, etc~, will be done "out-of-house." 
The in-house facilities and laboratories and centers will be·used to provide specifi-
cations, contract monitoring and some system integration, etc. 
Fourth, with regard to contractor ·selection, the ground rule was established 
that R&D contracts would ta.lee a minimum of twelve· ·weeks to iet. This minimum time 
must include the competition., evaluation ana.· coritractoir selection. phases. This is 
admittedly fast; some abbreviation or overlapping· of the proc'edures may be required 
in certain cases. 
As to construction of facilities, a: minimum of 38'·to-4o'weeks is·a.sstimed·for· 
developing design criteria,·A&E design and award of the ·construction contract.· One 
of the most important af;rnuniptions made is that of incremental C of · F funding, that is., 
funding as money is needed for the various phases of facilities development.· This 
was found to be a necessary ground rule since the<f.aqilities· 'turn out:~ to present a 
much more accelerated requirement than had been anticipated'.;. ··1 t· · wou.I'd· ·increase the 
FY 1962 and 1963 budget requirements . out of .:all pro·po;rtion ·; 1:f' incremental C of F fund-
ing were not used. · · 
•• • :· ,,f. •• '. 
Finally, all Saturn C-3 and Nova· vehicles are .·budgeted··under the ·1aunch vehicle 
item. _ All other vehicl_es _ '\'ffiich · are operational,. ~ .• g ~, · A:gerias, ::;centaurs, and C-1' s 
are budgeted by the mission. This· is in keeping with ·the way· it ·has been done in · 
the past. This last ground rule is not to .. e1?tabl_if!hta. ·pplicy.; ~~rather it was used as 
a budget guid~line to expedite the·budg~ting process· in this exercise so that money · 
.will not have to be transferred from pocket to pocket. 
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SPECIAL STUDY TASK 
BUDGET GUIDELINES 
e STRONG MANAGEMENT GROUP 
. . . 
e ASPR PROCEDURES THRO.UGHO'UT 
e PRIMARILY OUT-OF-HOUSE 
e ACCELERATED CONTRACTOR SELECTI.ON 
· R&D - 12 WKS· MIN TO .CONTRACT 
. ~ ·: ' ' . 
. , . . 
· · C OFF ~ 38-40 WKS 'TO CONSTRUCT I ON CONTRACT 
. · e INCREMENTAL C OFF FUNDING 
e ALL SATURN C-3 AND NOVA VEHICLES BUDGETED BY LAUNCH VEHICLES 
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Figure 37 presents a total funding-picture. 
While.an arbitrary start date of July 1., 1961 
was chosen., actually the budget picture can be 
broken up into a year-by-year·basis~ Thus., the 
start date can be adjusted backwards or forwards 
as required. It is seen that-tliefirst·year., or 
first twelve months from the--start date, requires 
846 million dollars for R&D and 272 million·-dollars 
for C of F. It is see:h that, the -buildup- in R&D -
occurs., as might be expected., about-midway in the 
program. However., C ·of F'.btiiidup- occurs. mu~h ,_. 
·earlier than might have been ·anticipated. · Large 
expendi~ures ~e re~fuired f_~r" :c-:of~F:Jh~. ~~rst 
year; the second year is the peak year and its 
requirements are much larger·.-everf'tpan--ror the' 
first year.· The total program money-requirements 
are. _sl!g}:l~ly less t:han. 12 b.illion dollars. 
. ;\-' 
~• ·: 1 ~ • ... 
'!. 
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...... '"' : TOTAL FUNDING REQUIREMEMENTS 
:·.·--; --------------------------S ~EC I AL S.TUDY TASK 
( IN MILLIONS OF $) YE AR 
.. 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
' 
·R&D 846 1755 2795 2728 1541 -- 813 · 
.. 
C of.· F : .. 272 546 316- 70 1 
. TOTALS · 1118 · .· 2301 ·3111 2798 ·1542 ·. 813 
TOTALS 
, .. 
, 
, 10,478 
1,205 
11,683 
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Figure 38 shows the funding requirements broken down into categories. The 
spacecraft item includes the Apollo, lunar landing and takeoff stages, the 18 orbit 
and the 14 day animal programs, the biomedical satellite·itself, exclusive of its 
instruments, and procurement of all the operational launch vehicles through Saturn 
C-1 to support these programs. · 
In launch vehicles and operations, the entire C-1, C-3 and Nova development 
programs are included. 
The lunar and space sciences item·tiicludes tne·total ti.nma.nned lunar program as 
well as the EG0 1s, radiation satellites and others considered as necessary additions 
for the manned lunar program. 
- Life Sciences has already been explained.·· It includes all the associated 
satellite specimens and instrumentation as well as the accelerated medical program 
and the selection and training of astronauts. 
The range and tracking ins.trumentation requirements _occur earlier than expected. 
. - - . . ... - - - - ' . ' ·- - - . - . - , ~ . . 
The advanced technology builds ·u1f at· a fa.st rate ·and-~pha.ses out about half way 
through the program because the information is. _r~quired _ e~~Y. 
On a percentage basis, the spacecraft is .. about·33 percent of.the total, the 
launch vehicle is about 50 percent· or· the total~- · supporting science and technology, 
that is, the lunar and space sciences, life sciences, and advanced technology taken 
together come to about 15 percent and range and tracking instrumentation about 
2 percent of the total. 
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SPACECRAFT 
LAUNCH VEHICLES & 
OPERATIONS 
LUNAR AND SPACE 
SCIENCES 
LIFE SCIENCES 
RANGE & TRACK I NG INST 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
TOTAL 
1st 
225 
660 
140 
30 
R 31 
32 
1,.118 
TOTAL FUNDING 
SPECIAL STUDY TASK 
R&D AND C of F 
(IN MILLIONS OF $) 
2nd lrd 4th YEAR 5th 6th 
586 1,045 1,176 570 255 
1,279 1,597 1,224 644 278 
··.· 
,. ·, 
.. 
'. 
236 317 . . . 312 · · 295-- .. 269 
49 47 46 33 11 
98 89 40 - -
53 16 - - . -
2,301 3,111 2,798 1,542 813 
TOTALS 
3,857 
5,682 
1,569 
216 
258 
101 
11,683 
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Figure 39 .shows cost :by year. The total cost is .-shown 
as 11.683 ·b±llion dollars·. 
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Figure 40 shows those elemehts·or the pro-
gram already included in the current 1962 bug.get. 
In launch vehicles, it is seen that·saturn, Nova 
propulsion technology, propulsion facilities~ Nova 
launch facilities and all Saturn facilities are ex-
tracted. In the spacecraft, the Apollo··program and 
the manned.space r11ght center a.re extracted. In 
range and tracking station instrumentation,·the.total 
lunar program plus the additional scientific satellite 
flights identified with this program are extracted. 
Practically all of the life sciences program, the · 
advanced technology program and· ·some-facilities that 
were associated with advanced facility design are 
also included • 
. In the current Fiscal Yea.r·1962budget then, 
668 million dollars or i:l&D ~tinds, · ·and 191 million 
dollars of c of F funds __ ror a total· of 859 million 
dollars are. available for application to the manned·· 
lunar program budget package under consideration.:_ 
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SPECIAL STUDY TASK. 
NASA FY 62 BUDGET CREDIT 
. (IN MILLIONS OF $) R&D 
LAUNCH VEHICLES 
SATURN 
NOVA 
PROPULS.ION TECH . 
PROPULSION ·FACILITIES . 
NOVA LAUNCJ'.LFA.ClllTY. 
SATURN -FAC I Lif I ES .. , 
SPACECRAFT 
APOLLO . . ... 
MANNED SPACE" FU GHT CENTER 
RANGE AND-TRACKIN~ INSTR. 
LUNAR AND SPACE SCIENCES · 
LUNAR PROGRAMS 
SC I ENT IF IC SATELLITES· 
LIFE SCIENCES 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
ADVANCED FACILITY DESIGN 
ITEM TOTAL 
358 
224 
48 
-86 - ... . .. 
160 
160 
131 
120. 
11 
19 19 
R&D 
.. ,y~ CofF 
668 
191 
859 
----
C OFF 
ITEM TOTAL 
121 
31 
28 
62 
60 
60 
5 5 
5 
5 
191 
87 
·, . 
... .,. 
., .. 
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•:; ..... _: .. 
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Figure 41 compares the present NASA.manned 
lunar_program budget of 859 million dQl+ars for 
1962 and the preliminary manned lunar budget of 
2.5 billion dollars for 1963 with the funding re-
quirements developed in this study for the same 
years. It should be kept in mind that the iatter 
need not.be specifically identified with particular 
fiscal years. 
' .: . 
The totals for the two years· ·combined are re-
latively close -- 3.359 billion versus 3~419 billion. 
Costs for the first year, however,- are ·considerably· 
different -- 1.118 billion versus·859·m11i1on.· This 
latter discrepancy can be··correcfted· by choosing a 
later start date to give·a:n expenditure for FY 1962 
corresponding to the present budget. 
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FUND I NG COMPARISON 
. ' 
FY 62 · 
NASA BUD"GET 859 
. · .... 
. . ls t yr 
STUDY TASK 1118 
{IN MILLIONS OF $) 
·. FY 63 
·2500 
·2nd yr 
2301 
WHAT START DATE CORRESPONDS TO NASA 
. ,. ~ :_. . 
F Y 6 2· - B U D G ET ? 
TOTAL 
3359 
TOTAL 
3419 
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It was mentioned earlier that the start date 
chosen (July 1, 1961) was arbitrary and there could 
therefore be some sliding around of the schedule. 
This flexibility was utilized 1ri matching-the FY 
1962 requirements with the present budget. The 
total time span 1n the program of about six years 
and the total program cost of 11.683 billion 
dollars were kept constant. ·Figure 42 shows the 
results of this for FY 1962 and 1963. -·rt was found 
that a start date of August 15, 1962·(a.six week ·re-
orientation in start date) would make.the cost match 
the present FY 196~ budget f igu.ref'f. · - Because of the 
usual parabolic buildup-- or cost curves, the second 
year's (FY 1963) requirements were such that the 
two year.totals.matched to within three percent. 
- - . --
When the R&D and C of F funding obligation rates 
were _considereq.. it was·_-found ·that the FY· 1962-·NASA' 
budget totals for R&D and C of F each appear ad~q~ate. 
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Figure 43 shows the total program adjusted 
again to the new start date of August 15. It 
should be emphasized again that this funding is 
necessary to get a crew safely on the moon and 
back again. There are, of course, other·programs 
being carried.out at the same time, e.g., the 
manned lunar station, etc., which would add to the 
costs presented. Only the manned lunar landing 
program "package" is considered,here. 
It is believed that the total amount and the 
year-by-year requirements are within reasonable 
limits even assuming some unforeseen circumstances. 
The FY 1962 total budget as well as the separate 
R&D·and C of F funding totals appear adequate for 
a reasonable start date -- August 15. Facilities 
have always required special care ilf scheduling 
and funding and will become even more critical 
this program because of their pacing nature. Thus, 
one recommendation resulting from this budget . 
analysis is that more flexibility is needed in 
C of F funding. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. The study has indicated that a manned lunar landing and return mission is 
feasible approximately six years after program initiation, thus putt_ing it in the 1967 
time period. 
2. A number of major management decisions and actions are required during the 
first six months of the program. Because these decisions and options encompass all 
aspects of the program, nearly simultaneous action is required in all program areas 
to insure integration and time phasing in a manner conducive to accomplishment of the 
manned lunar landing mission in the shortest time and at the least total cost. 
3. It is estimated that the total program cost, within the funding guidelines 
of the study, will amount to nearly twelve billion dollars extending over a six·· 
year period. Unforeseen technical difficulties or an extension of the time required 
to complete the program will increase the total cost accordinglyo 
4o A strong management organization is required to direct the programo. This 
organization should have broad authority in. controlling and coordinating the various.· 
aspects of the program. This item is extremely_ urgent, as such an organization must 
be established before many of the key decisions can be made and important actions can be 
taken.that are essential to timely and effective initiation and implementation of the 
program. 
5. There are two areas in which information is vitally needed to support design of the 
spacecraft and its lunar landing systemo These areas are: 1) the amount of solar radiation 
protection required for the crew·and 2) lunar surface characteristics. 
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r- 6. Facility construction and letting of the first stage development contracts are 
pacing items in the area of launch vehicle development. Pacing facility items are the 
first stage test stands and launch facilities for both the Saturn C-3 and the Nova. Both 
Nova and the C-3 must be started sinul.taneously to insure proper time phasing of the 
program. 
7. Because construction of major supporting facilities must be started during the 
first two years of the program, increased flexibility ot' facility funding, i.e., incre-
mental funding, etc., will be required in order to avoid an excessive fiscal impact during 
the early years of the program. 
8. Parallel development of liquid and solid first stage boosters for the Saturn C-3 
and Nova will be extremely costly. However, it will be virtually impossible to select 
either one in preference to the other solely on the b,asis of their relative performance · 
and reliability until two to three years after start of the program, because of the lack 
of operating experience with large solid rockets. · · 
9. The several areas of advanced research that support the program should be. 
expanded or accelerated to provide the basic,fnformation needed in·a timely manner. 
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